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This paper reports a wandering weekday effect: the pattern of day seasonality in stock market returns is
not ﬁxed, as assumed in the Monday or weekend effects, but changes over time. Analysing daily closing
prices in eleven major stock markets during 1993–2007, our results show that the wandering weekday is
not conditional on average returns in the previous week (the ‘‘twist” in the Monday effect). Nor does it
diminish through the period of analysis. The results have important implications for market efﬁciency,
and help to reconcile mixed ﬁndings in previous studies, including the reported disappearance of the
weekday effect in recent years.
 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Seasonality effects in stock markets refer to a diverse set of ﬁnd-
ings concerning calendar ‘‘anomalies” (Thaler, 1987a,b) in the mar-
ket. Collectively they show that returns are consistently higher on
some days of the week, or at some times of the month, or in some
months of the year, than others. These patterns are not limited to
US equity markets, but appear in futures, Treasury bills, debts
and exchange rates, and in non-US countries (Pettengill, 2003).
The efﬁcient market hypothesis (EMH) suggests that all past
ﬁnancial information is already reﬂected in current stock market
prices or returns (Fama, 1970). Therefore, seasonality effects chal-
lenge the EMH because they imply that, in the absence of transac-
tion costs, excess returns can be made simply by knowing what
day of the week it is, whether it is January, if it is around the turn
of the month, and so on. Moreover, any persistence over time of a
seasonality effect is an additional threat to EMH, because in the
efﬁcient market, once a seasonal inefﬁciency comes to light it
should immediately self-destruct as being part of the newly up-
dated body of information available to the public which prices
are supposed to full reﬂect (EMH/weak). Yet apparently the Mon-
day effect was known to traders as far back as the 1920s (Petteng-
ill, 2003). This article describes and investigates a new and morell rights reserved.
x: +44 29 2087 4417.
en@mdx.ac.uk (C.H. Chen).subtle conception of seasonality which is therefore a new kind of
challenge to EMH: the possibility that seasonality is in a continual
state of ﬂux, rather than ﬁxed over time.
One frequently tested claim, day seasonality, is that returns
stand predictable higher on certain days of the week than on others.
Day seasonality has a number of variant formulations. The standard
Monday effect suggests that Monday’s returns are lower than those
for Tuesday through Friday (French, 1980; Kamara, 1997); the
weekend effect examines the difference between returns for Mon-
days and Fridays alone (Cross, 1973); and the weekday effect (also
day-of-week effect, Ke et al., 2007) is simply that weekdays differ
in their expected returns. Being themost general test of day season-
ality, the weekday effect is preferable to testing the Monday or
weekend effects because it prevents researchers from prematurely
committing to an unnecessarily narrow focus and thereby missing
important results. Our results support this argument.
However, going beyond the weekday effect, the main innova-
tion in this article is to challenge the assumption of ﬁxity in day
seasonality. Previous studies, assuming that seasonality should
be steady over time, have presented mixed and inconsistent ﬁnd-
ings at different sample periods even for the same indices, detailed
in Section 2. But we allow that the pattern of day seasonality with-
in a market may shift over time, yet in a manner that is distin-
guishable from a random process. Thus, ‘‘mixed and inconsistent
ﬁndings” would be the natural state of affairs when testing for
ﬁxed seasonality. We call this the wandering weekday effect to
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To test the wandering weekday effect we model it as the interac-
tion of the weekday effect with time, and establish that it is present
in all the leading stock markets. We also show that the wandering
weekday is robust to different formulations, is not driven by mar-
ket trends (Jaffe et al., 1989), and has not vanished over time, con-
trary to Kohers et al. (2004).
The wandering weekday is important for several reasons. Look-
ing to future research, it establishes a whole new way that markets
can be shown to be inefﬁcient, instantly increasing the vulnerabil-
ity of EMH. By the same token, it means that any general theory of
weekday effects must be able to account for a much more complex
set of ﬁndings, which makes life difﬁcult for them too. Looking to
past research, it helps explain why evidence concerning a (ﬁxed)
weekday effect has sometimes been equivocal: different results
are to be expected if data have been sampled in different time
frames.
The layout of this article is as follows. Section 2 reviews past
evidence for seasonality effects. Section 3 describes the sample
and models to be run. Section 4 presents the results in four sub-
sections. Section 5 is the discussion.2. Seasonality in ﬂux
One of the implicit assumptions made in past seasonality re-
search is that seasonality effects are relatively stable through time.
The labels on many of these ﬁndings emphasize this stability: The
Weekend Effect, The Monday Effect, The January Effect, The Turn of the
Month Effect. Researchers have acknowledged that seasonality may
manifest differently for different markets, and have found between-
market variations in these effects. For instance, Agrawal and Tan-
don (1994) found seven markets in their sample exhibited lowest
returns on Mondays, as typically found in US data, whereas eight
markets had lowest returns on Tuesdays. More recently, Basher
and Sadorsky (2006) have also found divergences between day-
of-the-week effects in stock markets in emerging economies.
Notwithstanding these studies, which all ﬁnd some kind of
weekday effect in markets, other researchers have found little or
no weekday effects: Apolinario et al. (2006) studied ﬁfteen Euro-
pean markets in the period 1997–2004, but found signiﬁcant
weekday effects in only two markets. In their analysis of the
Shanghai and Shenzhen markets, Gao and Kling (2005, p. 75)
claimed that ‘‘the year-end effect was strong in 1991 – but disap-
peared later”. There are different ways to interpret these results.
One commonly held view is that the ﬁnal destination of all season-
ality effects should be the null hypothesis. Seasonal effects should
not survive public knowledge of their existence, and so will atten-
uate over time, showing that markets have become more efﬁcient
(Kohers et al., 2004).
On the other hand, it is possible that seasonal effects continu-
ally evolve. As an example, Mehdian and Perry (2001) found that
negative Monday returns pre-1987 had become signiﬁcant positive
Monday returns in the post-1987 period. Evolving seasonality ef-
fects may manifest as apparent attenuation at a particular point
in time, or when averaged over a period that includes both tradi-
tional and reversed Monday effects. Evolving seasonality may
therefore present as absence of seasonality. The more general point
is that all weekday effects in all stock markets may be in a perma-
nent state of ﬂux so that different researchers looking at the same
series may variously report the standard effect, an absence of the
effect, a reversal, or a totally new conﬁguration, all depending on
the haphazard sampling of time period that they analyse. What
might be driving this ﬂux?
One possibility that we will examine in some detail is that the
wandering weekday may be driven by the conditional Mondayeffect, also known as the ‘‘twist” in the Monday effect (Jaffe
et al., 1989). It has been found that markets on the down-turn ex-
hibit the traditional Monday effect more strongly than markets on
the up-turn, whether up-/down-turn is deﬁned at the week level
(Jaffe et al., 1989) or much longer (Liano, 1989).
However, it is also clear that the way business was done forty
years ago is different from how it is done today, so the conditions
that promoted a Monday effect in 1970 may no longer exist today.
Settlement procedures change, governments change the days on
which they announce key economic indicators (Steeley, 2001),
the availability of electronic trading, the changing nature of the
weekend, all have the potential to alter the signiﬁcance of each
day of the week. Therefore, many forces may drive the weekday ef-
fect into a continually adjusting pattern of changes. In addition,
endogenous forces may destabilize the weekday effect. Contrary
to the assumption that irrational effects will be automatically
traded away once brought to light, there is evidence that markets
over-react (De Bondt and Thaler, 1985; Lehmann, 1990), though
the success of momentum trading ( Antoniou et al., 2007; Asem,
2009) suggests a contrary view. If sufﬁcient people responded to
the simple formula of ‘‘Buy on Monday sell on Friday”, over-reac-
tion to seasonality effects might push Monday returns up beyond
equilibrium, leading to a new pattern of seasonality, which would
eventually be reacted to, and so on. What would make recursive
over-reaction hard to constrain is the difﬁculty of framing a ra-
tional reaction to irrational and erratic tendencies.3. Hypotheses and methods of analyses
3.1. Fixed day seasonals
Before examining the wandering weekday effect we pause to
examine the day seasonals under the assumption that they do
not vary with time, which is the usual stance taken in the litera-
ture. Temporarily laying aside the time dimension allows us to
re-create what researchers would have found in this data and the
conclusions they would have been forced to draw from it about
EMH. This makes it a useful point of reference to judge the beneﬁts
of our later analyses of time-varying effects.
Also, the three different formulation of day seasonality are pit-
ted against each other here. We show that the general weekday ef-
fect is more sensitive in detecting violations of EMH than the
Monday or weekend effect. This superiority of the weekday formu-
lation justiﬁes its later use in more complicated time-varying
analyses.
Until fairly recently, the standard way to analyze weekday ef-
fects was using OLS regression with daily returns as the dependent
and weekday dummy variables as the independent measures. See,
for example, Kamara (1997, p. 70). More recently, the ARCH/
GARCH family of models (Engle, 1982; Bollerslev, 1986) have be-
come standard. They allow researchers to model variance as condi-
tional on past variance and error, rather than ﬁxed throughout the
series, as in regression. A GARCH(p,q) model has p autoregressive
lags or ARCH terms, and q moving average lags (GARCH terms).
Engle (2001, p. 166) states that ‘‘GARCH(1,1) is the simplest and
most robust of the family of volatility models,” and is the most
widely applicable, see also Apolinario et al. (2006). Therefore, we
use GARCH(1,1) to impose a standardized analysis across all mar-
kets we consider.
Obviously, day seasonality should manifest in serial correlation
at lags of order 5, 10, 15, 20, etc. (Copeland and Wang, 1994),
which could form the basis for an alternative perspective to that
presented here. However, in this article we use ARMA terms as a
simple robustness test. If the weekday/wandering weekday is
unaffected by the presence or absence of ARMA terms, then the
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short-term-memory of our ARMA window, otherwise they would
be partialled out by the AR terms. To track serial correlation we
used 20 lagged (AR, or autoregressive) terms plus a single moving
average (MA) term. The lagged AR terms constitute 4 full weeks of
trading days. In the usual notation it was ARMA(20,1). This speci-
ﬁcation is quite inclusive. To test for ﬁxed day seasonality we use:






qkRtk þmet1 þ et : ð1Þ
Rt are returns at time t, deﬁned as Rt = loge(pt/pt1), where pt is the
closing price of the index at time t; Monday is the base condition
for Day dummies; qk are the coefﬁcients on the twenty lagged AR
terms; m is the coefﬁcient on the MA term. The error term et is
drawn from a normal distribution with variance rt which varies
over time conditional on past variances according to the
GARCH(1,1) formulation. Thus:
et  Nð0;r2t Þ;
and r2t ¼ xþ ae2t1 þ cr2t1: ð2Þ
In Eq. (2), a is the coefﬁcient on the ARCH(1) component, c is the
coefﬁcient on the GARCH(1) component, and x is the mean-revert-
ing constant.
We deﬁne the traditional Monday effect to be that returns on
Monday are lower than on other days of the week. There is also
the possibility of a revered Monday effect (Monday’s returns are
higher). Therefore we use 2-tailed testing. Using an explicit nota-
tion for Bj (1 = Mon, 2 = Tue, etc.), the null hypothesis is therefore:
BMon ¼ ðBTues þ BWed þ BThu þ BFriÞ=4:
Because Monday is used as the base for the day dummies,
BMon = 0, and the null reduces to:
H01 : BTues þ BWed þ BThu þ BFri ¼ 0 ðnull for Monday effectsÞ:
The weekend effect is that BMon < BFri, but again presuming the
possibility of a reversed weekend effect (BMon > BFri), and that Mon-
day is used as the base, the null becomes
H02 : BFri ¼ 0 ðnull for Monday effectsÞ:
The weekday effect is that the returns for different days of the
week are not equal. Presuming Monday is the base, so that
BMon = 0, its null hypothesis is
H03 : BTues ¼ BWed ¼ BThu ¼ BFri ¼ 0 ðnull for weekday effectÞ:
We test H1, H2, and H3 using post-estimation Wald tests.
3.2. Wandering weekday
The main innovation in this paper is to model the wandering
weekday effect. We analyse this as the interaction of time with
weekday. As already argued, the weekday formulation is more ﬂex-
ible than the Monday or weekend formulations. We achieve the
same degree of ﬂexibility in modelling time, by treating time as
disconnected categories, in the form of year-by-year snapshots,
rather than as continuous interval data, as is usual.1 To be speciﬁc,
the wandering weekday is tested as the interaction between year
dummies and day dummies. It allows us to test a very general form1 The most obvious way would be to use the count of trading days since the start of
the series. Thus ti = 1, 2, 3, . . ., ,3791 in the case of DAX. The problem with this
approach is that it assumes the wandering weekday will change in a linear fashion
with time. This is an unnecessarily constrained view of how the weekday effect will
wander. Including a quadratic t2i term is analytically complicated, and still only
captures the possibility of a there-and-back movement in weekday effects, rather
than the more erratic nature of wandering.of the hypothesis that weekday effects change over time. The
hypothesis anticipates no particular form to the interaction, either
generated by theory, expectations from past ﬁndings, or data
snooping. In order to compare changes in the market we need no
prior knowledge to decide on good breakpoints to deﬁne a before
and an after, and in doing so introduce a subtle source of bias.
We therefore preserve a credible Type I error rate. Finally, the gen-
erality of the method means that two markets that wander in dif-
ferent ways may still be meaningfully compared as to their
propensity to wander.
This method differs in two important ways from those of other
researchers who have reported changes in day seasonality. Our
time-slice of 1 year is much smaller than multi-year periods used
elsewhere (Lakonishok and Smidt 1988; Kohers et al., 2004). A year
is the smallest time period that includes an entire ﬁnancial cycle, all
four seasons etc. Second, we use interaction terms to formally test
changes in day seasonality across time-slices, rather than merely
note that a signiﬁcant effect in this period is no longer signiﬁcant
in that period. Accumulation of effects across short time-slices will
turn out to be crucial for observing the ﬁndings that we do.
To summarize, we estimated time effects by dummy variables
for year (1993 through 2007) and day-of-the-week effects by dum-
mies for Monday through Friday. We estimated changes in day-of-
the-week effects over time by the interaction of year x day
dummies.
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Terms are as is Eq. (1). Eq. (3) is the same as Eq. (1), but with the
additional Year and Year  Day interaction terms. Monday and
1993 are the base condition for the Day and Year dummy sets,
respectively. The wandering weekday has the following null
hypothesis:
H04 : bij ¼ 0 jointly for i ¼ 2; . . . ;15; and
j ¼ 2; . . . ;5: ðnull for the wandering weekdayÞ
H04 implies that, in estimating Rt, no adjustments to the Day coef-
ﬁcients need be made in any Year. In other words, the weekday ef-
fect does not vary with time. Rejecting H04 implies that it does vary
with time.
3.3. Challenges to the wandering weekday
3.3.1. Wandering to a halt, or still wandering?
EMH expects that, once known about, seasonality effects should
be traded away and disappear over time. As a signiﬁcant weekday
effect moves towards the null hypothesis of no weekday effect, it
must obviously change. This change is also a weekday  time
interaction, but one that has very different implications from a
weekday effect that continues to wander, undiminished over time.
To examine whether the weekday effect grinds to a halt (as sug-
gested in Kohers et al, 2004) rather than continues to wander,
we run the simple weekday model in Eq. (1) for each year and
for each index. We measure the strength of the weekday effect at
each year by combining the v2s for each of the indices into a com-
bined v2 for that year. If the weekday is diminishing to a halt, the
v2s should also diminish in size over the years, which can be tested
by simple correlation.
3.3.2. Conditional Monday
We examine whether the wandering weekday can be ex-
plained by up-turns and down-turns of the market. The prece-
2 A shares are traded by Chinese nationals and, after November 2002, also by a
number of selected Foreign Qualiﬁed Institutional Investors. B shares may be traded
by foreign investors and starting from March 2001 also be traded by Chinese
nationals as well, but only with their legal foreign currency accounts.
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Jaffe et al. deﬁned market down-turns/up-turns by average re-
turns for the previous week, and found that the traditional Mon-
day effect was bigger when the market had experienced a down-
turn, while in up-turns this effect was much less pronounced, or
even reversed. Like the wandering weekday, then, the Monday
effect changes over time, prompting the question whether the
wandering weekday can be reduced to the conditional Monday.
The week-sized effect of the conditional Monday aggregates to
a year-sized effect quite naturally. A year that has many poor-re-
turn weeks in it would present a clear Monday effect in each
week that followed, accumulating to a clear Monday effect
across such a year, and so on; and vice versa for good-return
years. The weekday effect would be different for good and poor
years, and appear in our analyses to be wandering.
To determine whether the wandering weekday is simply the
conditional Monday by another name, we need to show that the
wandering weekday disappears when it is analysed in conjunction
with the conditional Monday (tested as H8). On the other hand, if
the wandering weekday does not disappear, then it is not driven by
market trends. But this only needs to be tested if there actually is a
conditional Monday effect present (tested as H5), or its variants
(H6, H7).
To formulate the conditional Monday we ﬁrst deﬁne a new var-
iable to be the mean daily returns for week T.
WT ¼ ðRMon;T þ RTues;T þ RWed;T þ RThu;T þ RFri;TÞ=5:
If a market was closed for part of week T, WT was taken to be the
mean of the days for which it was open. If it was not open at all,
the means from the previous week were used: WT =WT1. We use
the lagged WT1 as a moderator of the daily returns in week T,
and introduce the following new terms into Eq. (3):




There are two aims in introducing these terms. First is to repli-
cate the conditional Monday and extend it to the conditional week-
end and conditional weekday. These are tested equivalently to the
ﬁxed effects in Section 4.1, except that H5 and H6 are directional.
The conditional weekend requires that when WT1 decreases, Fri-
day returns should increase relative to Monday. Therefore, qFri
should be less than qMon. Similarly, according to the conditional
Monday, when WT-1 decreases the net of Tuesday, Wednesday,
Thursday and Friday should increase relative to Monday, thus
enhancing the traditional Monday effect. This means that the aver-
age of their q coefﬁcients should be less than Monday’s. But, con-
sistent with our strategy of general testing to avoid missing
results, we can test H5 and H6 with 2-tailed tests to cover the pos-
sibility of reversals of the conditional effects. Null hypotheses are
therefore:
H05 : qMon ¼ ðqTues þ qWed þ qThu þ qFriÞ=4
ðnull for conditional MondayÞ;
H06 : qMon ¼ qFri ðnull for conditional weekendÞ;
H07 : qMon ¼ qTues ¼ qWed ¼ qThu ¼ qFri ¼ 0
ðnull for conditional weekdayÞ:
Note WT1  Day are not a system of dummies so that Monday is
not dropped as a base.
The second aim is to determine whether the wandering week-
day is still present in the face of the conditional weekday. The null
for it has the same form as H04.H08 : bij ¼ 0 jointly for i ¼ 2; . . . ;15; and
j ¼ 2; . . . ;5: ðnull for wandering weekdayÞ:
The logic of using, as a control, the previous week’s returns to
condition this week’s returns is similar to that of Venezia and
Shapiro (2007). Their equivalent of WT was the return from just
the last day of the previous week, however.
3.4. Sample and data
Our sample consists of 13 closing price indices from the major
markets of USA (NYSE composite, Amex composite, Nasdaq com-
posite), Japan (Nikkei225), UK (FTSE100), Germany (DAX30),
France (CAC40) and Hong Kong (Hang Seng composite), where
we would expect the markets to run most efﬁciently. We also in-
clude China (Shanghai A Shares, Shanghai B Shares, Shenzhen A
Shares, Shenzhen B Shares) and India (Sensex30) as important
upcoming emerging markets.
Multiple indices aid in generalisation of the ﬁndings, particu-
larly when drawn from developed and developing economies,
and prevent data snooping, which has been seen as an endemic
problem in seasonality research (Lo and MacKinlay, 1990; Sullivan
et al., 2001). Multiple indices within a country (USA and China) are
justiﬁed by size, but also because speciﬁc comparisons between
those markets can be made with fewer confounding factors to
cloud the issue. For instance, Chan et al. (2004) have documented
greater levels of institutional holdings (versus individual) in the
NYSE, than in Amex and Nasdaq. If institutional investors trade
more efﬁciently than individual investors (Kamara, 1997), then
NYSE should exhibit less strong day seasonal effects than Amex
and Nasdaq. A more speciﬁc expectation derives from the ﬁndings
of Venezia and Shapira (2007). They found that ‘‘amateurs” traded
more heavily than ‘‘professionals” on Sunday (the day following
the Israeli weekend), with a particular concentration on sell deci-
sions. Since selling drives the market down, the implication is that
Amex and Nasdaq, having more amateur investors than NYSE,
should exhibit greater Monday effects in particular.
Also, China’s stock exchanges both have a system of A shares
and B shares.2 One possibility is that the B shares should be traded
more efﬁciently than their A share counterparts, because of the pre-
sumed greater sophistication of foreign investors. Conversely, for-
eign investors may not have access to the same richness of
information that A-share traders have, meaning that B-shares may
be traded less efﬁciently.
All the daily closing price index data were downloaded from
Datastream for 1993–2007, inclusive. Unavailability of complete
data for China prior to 1993 imposes a limit on how far back in
time we go; and for compatibility of analysis we use the same time
frame for all markets. The number of returns varied from 3638
(Shenzhen A) to 3791 (DAX). The descriptive statistics for returns
are presented in Table 1. Panel A has a full set of descriptive statis-
tics for each weekday for each market. Panel B has mean returns
only, but disaggregated by weekday by market by year. It is at this
most speciﬁc level that the wandering weekday operates. Indices
were generally symmetrically distributed (median skew across
all indices = 0.02). While the indices also exhibited the usual pat-
tern of fat tails for return distributions, they were not extremely so
(median excess kurtosis = 3.82). Nonetheless, we did conﬁrm the
most critical results with outlier-robust procedures. Panel C shows
mean daily returns, disaggregated by year by market.
Table 1
Descriptive statistics of the returns for the 13 indices.
Mean (106) Median (106) s.d. (106) min. (106) max. (106) Skew Excess kurtosis N
Panel A: Descriptives for markets by weekday
NYSE Mon 374 679 9801 67,911 50,499 1.08 7.73 711
Tue 343 390 9414 39,556 44,795 0.07 3.00 773
Wed 562 723 8580 31,669 51,789 0.25 2.86 773
Thu 63 227 9146 39,197 47,481 0.11 2.78 759
Fri 436 824 8959 52,747 35,077 0.54 2.81 757
Amex Mon 1144 993 9969 68,775 51,177 0.97 8.52 712
Tue 599 468 9480 42,518 48,058 0.16 3.21 768
Wed 408 479 8830 28,587 57,668 0.34 3.15 771
Thu 232 283 9294 34,829 46,683 0.10 2.02 758
Fri 60 397 9378 54,766 35,406 0.69 3.35 756
Nasdaq Mon 331 1108 15,847 89,536 63,536 0.92 4.49 713
Tue 125 508 16,465 75,065 99,636 0.30 4.53 774
Wed 1180 2159 15,844 73,903 132,546 0.45 9.09 774
Thu 681 1221 15,382 49,318 85,454 0.32 2.58 759
Fri 354 1249 15,015 101,684 75,791 0.28 6.04 757
Nikkei Mon 598 114 15,919 72,340 76,605 0.00 2.70 702
Tue 588 197 12,708 52,425 42,256 0.02 0.82 750
Wed 145 61 13,750 68,645 72,217 0.26 2.51 751
Thu 320 308 13,567 59,571 45,840 0.14 1.34 747
Fri 338 118 13,236 55,696 60,787 0.05 2.30 746
FTSE Mon 234 640 10,881 55,890 45,279 0.16 3.52 706
Tue 78 240 10,298 58,853 49,301 0.10 3.30 769
Wed 117 220 9907 49,178 41,089 0.31 2.13 775
Thu 279 222 10,694 48,664 59,026 0.14 3.60 774
Fri 616 1264 10,209 47,410 45,567 0.36 2.18 761
DAX Mon 320 902 9640 57,754 43,798 0.74 3.72 744
Tue 91 495 8945 68,409 41,731 1.18 7.90 767
Wed 400 786 8978 41,307 40,874 0.21 2.20 768
Thu 526 1129 9275 47,738 44,505 0.80 4.10 757
Fri 1161 1818 8311 45,185 34,754 0.75 3.54 755
CAC Mon 228 605 13,655 60,448 68,009 0.15 3.13 736
Tue 345 558 12,861 76,781 67,267 0.21 3.99 771
Wed 29 452 12,679 45,075 60,966 0.09 1.45 769
Thu 371 497 13,911 56,272 61,298 0.13 2.19 763
Fri 547 585 12,501 55,492 70,023 0.07 2.60 752
H’Seng Mon 207 835 18,845 90,988 13,3954 0.05 6.13 715
Tue 619 760 14,059 14,7347 71,159 1.36 17.22 752
Wed 753 624 17,670 92,854 17,2471 1.03 13.89 751
Thu 533 95 15,664 10,9924 61,958 0.72 4.70 751
Fri 1140 566 15,188 51,084 86,101 0.66 3.81 737
S’zhnA Mon 876 801 27,509 105,332 295,777 1.96 21.35 723
Tue 73 1408 21,196 196,323 125,004 1.70 17.00 729
Wed 1332 1143 21,403 147,763 151,718 0.47 8.99 731
Thu 974 901 23,457 102,336 259,419 1.68 22.73 730
Fri 1301 1198 20,374 97,964 110,645 0.32 4.90 725
S’zhnB Mon 1610 117 26,104 105,332 124,655 0.43 4.63 693
Tue 791 45 21,647 100,722 97,262 0.19 5.66 720
Wed 265 419 21,022 166,994 95,274 0.10 9.31 724
Thu 41 230 21,885 87,151 103,378 0.59 4.80 720
Fri 1515 262 22,059 159,702 137,981 0.37 9.50 713
S’haiA Mon 403 319 28,477 146,005 308,523 1.55 22.01 724
Tue 302 1456 21,401 184,271 116,218 1.45 13.95 732
Wed 1815 928 22,581 117,405 200,777 1.93 18.36 735
Thu 786 599 24,332 117,928 278,511 1.96 27.06 734
Fri 1482 365 20,474 76,166 201,405 1.81 16.59 732
S’haiB Mon 342 1318 25,996 102,917 121,837 0.26 3.56 720
Tue 348 59 21,689 98,659 115,262 0.38 5.81 727
Wed 967 444 21,333 97,192 94,238 0.30 4.45 734
Thu 42 904 22,753 86,192 95,265 0.61 3.82 731
Fri 1342 122 20,659 130,846 94,170 0.19 5.03 727
Sensex Mon 584 1536 18,802 118,092 85,915 0.66 4.46 728
Tue 64 724 14,468 74,226 79,311 0.34 3.51 727
Wed 1370 997 15,118 46,224 73,141 0.29 1.36 728
Thu 576 1135 15,247 70,033 66,670 0.13 1.67 733
Fri 218 918 16,006 62,986 69,922 0.02 2.04 723
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Table 1 (continued)
NYSE Amex Nasdq Nikkei FTSE DAX.. CAC.. Hseng S’zhnA S’zhnB S’haiA S’haiB Sensx
Panel B: Mean daily returns (x106) for each index and each year, 19931999
1993 Mon 1722 2478 64 2570 1192 887 861 2163 2189 4733 9312 2828 5297
Tue 534 834 636 118 173 1866 1037 3158 2490 1085 589 42 755
Wed 1069 746 2896 180 2018 236 998 4492 1579 1264 1377 3333 3648
Thu 20 115 230 3771 496 2771 1025 4318 4407 545 6645 1436 3890
Fri 697 399 105 186 107 2133 2201 1065 1247 1330 2475 7755 4079
1994 Mon 152 499 816 754 171 920 186 2655 8053 842 2847 1738 4976
Tue 212 27 578 905 302 1378 457 1988 1831 3681 216 3643 1455
Wed 381 540 260 561 928 804 2133 302 2776 1537 2012 1769 3440
Thu 591 426 25 997 498 47 1205 5604 1750 2432 4201 2165 515
Fri 59 508 420 797 231 285 618 938 99 1610 34 555 3079
1995 Mon 861 1420 84 1970 616 1120 2067 353 3001 2001 2248 1218 4542
Tue 1154 1738 515 2115 55 1104 1233 1550 8456 1735 5731 2423 3185
Wed 1185 1372 1338 262 2543 603 3129 1744 1553 2818 1010 1590 1718
Thu 1030 553 2726 751 1100 43 1133 625 1149 945 789 800 208
Fri 1175 822 2058 448 529 115 1531 572 6515 472 4589 1214 973
1996 Mon 1176 2142 449 2073 125 880 134 2027 13578 9510 8325 1608 1958
Tue 46 787 1071 1680 440 10 2470 2295 3475 287 7109 5619 2665
Wed 284 171 2250 224 296 1467 184 1182 8621 543 6779 1329 4117
Thu 870 757 1659 346 601 28 980 9 1614 3546 3275 899 1038
Fri 1223 907 1681 273 1278 554 987 313 4944 6932 5858 617 571
1997 Mon 1426 2565 899 1241 1215 1206 1331 1194 1992 1340 2992 176 1761
Tue 5309 6676 3838 1838 3009 96 3455 6016 1389 10335 2184 5773 1942
Wed 508 1843 230 2008 1292 4765 3899 5234 1769 1200 2700 3207 2936
Thu 1769 2446 1805 2516 263 937 1972 7805 2580 101 2101 2374 2374
Fri 702 396 610 4854 931 843 1754 3099 3767 2850 4270 1001 1026
1998 Mon 327 865 401 511 2538 2101 2578 3325 1935 1188 2037 3791 4340
Tue 2528 2038 3364 2152 2943 867 3741 655 2573 575 2006 1364 3135
Wed 1362 1500 3945 2160 1189 1286 2123 2450 1964 5008 1883 3407 229
Thu 2573 3180 3297 3647 3579 3191 4654 2935 1179 7231 1106 5633 1418
Fri 1996 2099 2880 1945 317 31 1590 1902 1944 306 2742 811 3873
1999 Mon 306 2162 3940 2610 2028 666 3852 4690 1189 1455 1368 1109 5897
Tue 3227 2263 3327 752 1856 555 1486 253 776 8150 491 7824 3136
Wed 1787 1436 5471 474 141 492 60 1489 4306 1791 4336 317 2527
Thu 840 968 1616 3237 1702 2077 3551 3238 384 10777 595 8093 1182
Fri 2103 1109 4785 328 1641 585 2396 4132 1273 4270 553 4373 2513
2000 Mon 2063 3949 5850 2854 1802 825 717 2430 5211 6706 5095 8108 268
Tue 801 1052 1233 957 120 307 1430 76 223 4331 837 2239 748
Wed 2595 2115 10128 741 1949 1364 5541 372 997 3810 752 6408 1131
Thu 1612 74 4216 6001 175 802 2192 4163 1166 366 1619 2384 1844
Fri 1471 4006 2950 1516 1798 2036 2605 4747 2601 4629 2152 3538 3496
2001 Mon 479 168 2547 7195 455 79 2652 4021 4914 2490 4483 1639 1440
Tue 113 414 2672 1820 526 204 1858 97 3722 7612 3888 6072 1196
Wed 1177 1338 2414 1761 1337 1550 1696 952 2066 821 2012 4008 1915
Thu 1316 1870 4448 641 595 674 739 224 3749 1535 3375 178 883
Fri 1947 1758 6473 442 1414 987 3140 1247 497 3330 834 2062 6812
2002 Mon 2006 1503 2497 2604 2501 2810 3867 913 2757 6671 3073 5548 463
Tue 3471 2565 5348 2829 2079 3131 1952 464 2463 985 2910 1779 1906
Wed 2380 2639 4087 2032 4041 2771 3502 2712 2787 578 2595 963 640
Thu 992 1166 2376 3446 2863 390 3041 822 645 1389 484 1405 591
Fri 314 508 1381 364 107 1189 1823 1773 1778 594 1749 1822 3022
2003 Mon 986 1232 2347 2170 1664 1698 269 2210 521 2074 1267 1509 1287
Tue 1620 1555 4114 1042 386 651 1314 1288 1140 1289 1424 724 2021
Wed 591 1127 868 1654 1557 531 712 302 845 2331 1789 665 2518
Thu 1706 837 3893 1088 718 3141 2306 1237 1219 1200 766 67 1223
Fri 1340 1316 1412 845 2244 3082 3066 3517 2266 842 1766 1613 3860
2004 Mon 188 136 867 1046 710 420 779 85 2206 2648 2089 5868 1235
Tue 1394 1171 1408 581 885 783 468 2031 1646 1886 1327 2580 2612
Wed 436 940 485 744 393 641 758 116 1185 3683 967 1751 112
Thu 187 453 678 1368 340 636 368 975 2460 2997 2357 1722 181
Fri 479 436 443 1642 439 1979 543 1438 1824 4133 1192 3381 676
(continued on next page)
J.R. Doyle, C.H. Chen / Journal of Banking & Finance 33 (2009) 1388–1399 1393
Table 1 (continued)
NYSE Amex Nasdq Nikkei FTSE DAX.. CAC.. Hseng S’zhnA S’zhnB S’haiA S’haiB Sensx
2005 Mon 1111 624 1299 2500 1178 2576 1521 1787 259 4202 716 5531 2783
Tue 915 1165 929 1534 1017 800 1300 979 568 1390 1033 1300 457
Wed 250 125 275 696 1121 258 847 67 3410 1658 2966 3066 1017
Thu 10 812 72 50 18 165 71 61 3316 2477 2843 2872 580
Fri 1003 378 250 2242 2112 2785 2098 178 1840 1108 173 218 2235
2006 Mon 192 369 346 1683 313 384 243 36 6835 8882 7376 7046 476
Tue 640 534 44 1113 1624 1549 1256 1097 2879 550 3128 203 428
Wed 1907 1961 2503 1362 1706 2562 2813 2545 1602 2194 2222 3494 2694
Thu 1007 673 917 4109 911 2456 1447 2893 113 1678 832 926 2066
Fri 196 613 1418 1340 669 1738 348 1459 2597 3220 3799 3697 2987
2007 Mon 1035 371 1352 166 1409 852 1043 2567 11676 7251 9764 8002 1721
Tue 7 32 574 792 129 214 493 3687 5373 3380 3090 3854 2614
Wed 2263 1729 3242 3214 408 55 482 654 3062 115 2963 2081 99
Thu 1298 403 1394 2859 562 37 36 2300 1577 1605 1330 1209 2825
Fri 1251 123 697 3013 1204 1510 1336 1020 1922 1146 417 6239 469
Note that the ﬁrst ﬁve data columns have been scaled by 106.
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Because the conclusions drawn from with-ARMA and no-ARMA
analyses are so similar (though with-ARMA results tend to be
slightly more powerful), in the text we discuss only the with-
ARMA versions unless otherwise stated. Both with-ARMA and no-
ARMA analyses are presented in the Tables, however.
4.1. Fixed weekday effects
Table 2 shows that the Monday effect is signiﬁcant at 5% for
only Amex, and the weekend effect is signiﬁcant for Amex and
DAX. Given that thirteen indices have been analysed, the research-
er might conclude that ﬁnding one or two signiﬁcant results is not
much better than chance. This is conﬁrmed by summing the v2s
and the dfs into a combined v2 test for the 13 indices. We have:
the Monday: v2(13) = 13.52, p > 0.4; the weekend: v2(13) = 13.64,
p > 0.4. We cannot reject H01 or H02. By failing to ﬁnd inefﬁcien-
cies, these results would be taken as evidence supporting EMH
across the globe.
A different story emerges from analysing the more general
weekday effect. We ﬁnd results signiﬁcant at 5% for Amex, Nasdaq
and DAX. Combining v2s across all indices we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant ef-
fect for combined v2(52) = 77.96, p = 0.011. We therefore reject H0
3. Furthermore, no signiﬁcant results were found for the Monday
or weekend effects that were not also found for the weekday effect.
Therefore, the omnibus weekday test detected the same effects
that the Monday and weekend tests detected, but more besides.
We draw two conclusions. First, seasonality effects still exist to
push returns for some days of the week lower than for others,
though not necessarily Monday relative to Friday, or Monday rela-
tive to the rest of the week. These effects, more evident in some
markets than others, must persist long enough to register as
time-invariant day-of-the-week differences, certainly long enough
to take it outside the ARMA window of 20 lags. Second, the contin-
ued existence of relatively stable seasonality effects may have been
missed had we taken too narrow a perspective (e.g. testing only for
the Monday effect). Analysing for the more general weekday effect,
rather than the speciﬁc Monday or weekend effects, is not only
good statistical practice, but turns out to have been more powerful
in rejecting the null of market efﬁciency.
4.2. Wandering weekday effect
To test H4, the wandering weekday effect, we use Eq. (3). The
null is that the weekday effect does not change its pattern signiﬁ-cantly over the years of analysis. Obviously, in rejecting H04 we
would be undermining the very assumption we made in analysing
the ﬁxed weekday effect in (Section 5.1), which is the same
assumption tacitly made in previous research. The results for tests
of the year  day interaction terms are in Table 3. Most obviously,
the wandering weekday is signiﬁcant at the 1% level for all 13 indi-
ces. Therefore we reject H04. The results present a much stronger
case against EMH than those from the previous section.
Analyzing the S&P500 from 1980 onwards, Galai et al. (2008)
found that outliers in the data tended to mask seasonality effects.
However, it is also possible that in other data outliers might actu-
ally be responsible for (spurious?) seasonality effects that would
not be found if outliers were eliminated from the data. Therefore,
as a general robustness check, the assumption of Gaussian distur-
bance terms was relaxed, by repeating the analyses but using the
general error distribution (GED). Rather than excluding extremes
readings as unlikely to have come from a Gaussian distribution
(i.e. treat them as outliers, as in Galai et al.), this approach seeks
to incorporate extremes as natural observations from fat-tailed
distributions. All results were again signiﬁcant, the overall level
of signiﬁcance of the GED version (geometric mean probabil-
ity = 1.26  1011) being approximately equivalent to the Gaussian
version (5.29  1010). Furthermore, the ranking of the indices by
strength of wandering weekday was roughly as before (Spearman’s
rank correlation Rho = 0.83).
The interaction of year  day (wandering weekday) is that the
pattern of the weekday effect is not ﬁxed but changes over time.
Different from the random walk, which has no memory, the week-
day effect must have some memory so that it dwells near one pat-
tern long enough to be detected within our one-year time-slices.
On the other hand, the wandering weekday does not have the
near-perfect memory of the ﬁxed weekday, which is presumed to
be stable over time. Therefore, in terms of its memory, the wander-
ing weekday effect lies between the random walk and the ﬁxed
week effect. It is transiently stable.
There are several more speciﬁc points of interest. First, if the
size of the wandering weekday is a sign of market inefﬁciency,
then we can see from Table 3 that the Indian and Chinese mar-
kets were generally more inefﬁcient than those in western econ-
omies, as anticipated at the outset. Second, the evidence is
positive but weak for the greater efﬁciency of NYSE than Amex
and Nasdaq. Recall that NYSE has a greater proportion of institu-
tional investors than the other two. The size of the ﬁxed weekday
effect is larger for Amex and Nasdaq than for NYSE, but the size of
the wandering weekday effect is greater for Nasdaq than both
NYSE and Amex, which are themselves about equivalent. Note
Table 2
Analyses of Monday, weekend and weekday effects, assuming time-invariance.
No ARMA With ARMA
Monday Weekend Weekday Monday Weekend Weekday
v2 (df = 1) v2 (df = 1) v2 (df = 4) v2 (df = 1) v2 (df = 1) v2 (df = 4)
NYSE 0.43+ 0.20+ 2.01 0.45+ 0.17+ 1.95
Amex 6.48+ 6.43+ 11.32 6.34+ 5.82+ 11.03
Nasdaq 0.17 0.08+ 11.80 0.19 0.11+ 13.06
Nikkei 1.82 0.24 4.26 1.81 0.21 4.00
FTSE 0.00 0.94+ 3.47 0.00 1.01+ 3.76
DAX 0.68 4.89+ 12.78 0.64 5.14+ 12.54
CAC 0.01+ 0.23+ 1.20 0.01+ 0.25+ 1.08
Hang Seng 0.34+ 0.01+ 1.47 0.30+ 0.00+ 1.47
Shenzhen A 0.54 0.30 8.96 0.24 0.41 5.76
Shenzhen B 3.07+ 0.00+ 10.14 3.09+ 0.01+ 8.78
Shanghai A 0.20 0.01 6.56 0.12 0.08 6.45
Shanghai B 0.07 0.05+ 2.63 0.09 0.28+ 3.08
Sensex 0.22+ 0.15+ 5.16 0.24+ 0.15+ 5.00
Prob. Prob. Prob. Prob. Prob. Prob.
NYSE 0.512 0.655 0.734 0.502 0.680 0.745
Amex 0.011 0.011 0.023 0.012 0.016 0.026
Nasdaq 0.680 0.777 0.019 0.663 0.740 0.011
Nikkei 0.177 0.624 0.372 0.179 0.647 0.406
FTSE 1.000 0.332 0.482 1.000 0.315 0.439
DAX 0.410 0.027 0.012 0.424 0.023 0.014
CAC 0.920 0.632 0.878 0.920 0.617 0.897
Hang Seng 0.560 0.920 0.832 0.584 1.000 0.832
Shenzhen A 0.462 0.584 0.062 0.624 0.522 0.218
Shenzhen B 0.080 1.000 0.038 0.079 0.920 0.067
Shanghai A 0.655 0.920 0.161 0.729 0.777 0.168
Shanghai B 0.791 0.823 0.622 0.764 0.597 0.545
Sensex 0.639 0.699 0.271 0.624 0.699 0.287
Combined v2 14.03 13.53 81.76 13.52 13.64 77.96
df 13 13 52 13 13 52
Probability 0.372 0.408 0.005 0.408 0.400 0.011
The daily returns for each stock market in turn, in the period 1993–2007, are estimated by weekday dummies, as in Eq. (1). The error term was modeled by GARCH(1,1). For
each index ARMA(20,1) terms were either included (three columns of data on the right), or not (three columns of data on the left). The upper panel contains the v2 statistics
from post-estimation Wald test, which are conducted to test the following:
H1: Returns on Monday are lower than for the other days of the week (Monday effect, data columns 1 and 4).
H2: Returns on Monday are lower than on Friday (Weekend effect, data columns 2 and 5).
H3: Returns differ between days of the week (Weekday effect, data columns 3 and 6).
The probabilities for each of these v2 tests are in the panel below, with 5% signiﬁcant results in bold. To gauge the overall signiﬁcance across all 13 indices, v2 and degrees of
freedom are summed column-wise to give combined v2 tests. These and associated probabilities are reported in the last three rows. The plus or minus sign that follows the
v2(1) statistics indicates the direction of the effect, with minus indicating that Monday returns were lower, as in the traditional Monday and weekday effects. Note also,
v2(1) = z2, so these columns can be turned into z-tests.
Table 3
Wandering weekday effect for 13 indices.
No ARMA With ARMA
v2 (df = 56) Prob. v2 (df = 56) Prob.
NYSE 97.56 0.0005 117.18 <0.0001
Amex 98.95 0.0004 104.25 <0.0001
Nasdaq 120.36 <0.0001 153.26 <0.0001
Nikkei 77.83 0.0284 90.04 0.0026
FTSE 79.88 0.0198 97.48 0.0005
DAX 91.26 0.0020 118.30 <.0001
CAC 87.36 0.0046 103.28 0.0001
Hang Seng 80.48 0.0177 95.67 0.0008
Shenzhen A 432.02 <0.0001 213.89 <0.0001
Shenzhen B 250.85 <0.0001 282.51 <0.0001
Shanghai A 565.01 <0.0001 153.62 <0.0001
Shanghai B 142.29 <0.0001 162.30 <0.0001
Sensex 128.02 <0.0001 148.76 <0.0001
The daily returns for each stock market in the period 1993–2007 are estimated by
weekday dummies, year dummies, and the interaction of day  year dummies as in
Eq. (3). As in Table 1, error is estimated by GARCH(1,1), and estimates are repeated
both with and without ARMA(20,1). Post-estimation Wald tests are conducted to
test:
H4: The year  day coefﬁcients are jointly different from zero.
v2s for this test are in data columns 1 (no ARMA in estimation), and 3 (ARMA
included), and associated probabilities are in columns 2 and 4, respectively.
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than the general weekday for Amex and Nasdaq relative to NYSE,
as anticipated by our extrapolation of the ﬁndings in Venezia and
Shapiro (2007). Finally, there is no real support for the contention
that Chinese B shares would be traded more efﬁciently than A
shares, or vice versa.
4.3. Challenges to wandering weekday effect
4.3.1. Still wandering
To test whether the weekday effect wanders to a halt or contin-
ues to wander, we reran Eq. (1) for each index but for each of the
15 years separately. For these analyses no-ARMA results are pre-
sented in Table 43.
For each year the combined v2 statistic across all indices was
used as a simple measure of the strength of the weekday effect
present in that year. The results are clear cut. There was no de-
crease (or increase) in the size of the weekday effect over the per-
iod (Spearman’s Rho = 0.11 for the correlation of year with size of
effect). The same lack of trend was found when the indices were3 When ARMA components were modeled, 47 of the 195 GARCHs failed to
converge, possibly due to under-constraint in estimating with these additional 21
terms. For this reason, we used no ARMA.
Table 4
Year-by-year weekday effects.
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
NYSE 5.24 1.07 0.12 4.31 7.89 4.24 8.01 11.10 2.15 3.36 2.11 1.11 2.61 4.92 7.68
Amex 6.91 0.97 3.71 4.09 16.98 3.99 6.13 11.14 2.72 2.88 3.93 2.63 2.39 11.52 2.69
Nasdaq 9.40 1.69 0.90 6.83 4.18 10.38 9.93 8.80 3.14 5.45 8.06 1.54 1.96 7.39 7.29
Nikkei 3.38 1.85 1.59 2.55 5.18 8.23 6.70 13.26 5.66 5.66 2.04 2.72 5.60 6.38 10.65
FTSE 3.62 0.48 6.79 2.44 6.62 3.51 8.04 4.09 0.63 8.78 3.88 1.73 11.66 11.39 3.22
DAX 5.80 4.93 6.21 3.10 10.91 1.97 4.85 3.83 6.98 4.99 4.60 2.27 8.74 12.78 0.29
CAC 5.61 2.16 7.26 4.52 8.12 4.00 8.01 11.40 4.84 5.66 3.25 0.37 7.03 9.31 3.85
H’ Seng 1.86 2.86 1.84 2.36 8.81 2.20 4.13 6.79 1.07 6.73 4.20 3.38 3.26 6.28 10.13
S’zhen A 5.34 15.10 1.75 5.48 6.90 6.30 4.69 0.94 13.05 11.12 6.49 4.79 6.06 9.22 8.76
S’zhen B 8.95 0.65 2.54 12.95 8.68 35.32 10.10 3.79 4.31 5.19 0.72 7.20 12.88 23.25 4.47
S’hai A 5.62 20.15 0.59 13.84 4.56 6.56 3.90 1.55 13.63 12.94 5.54 4.83 3.53 9.06 8.18
S’hai B 8.38 5.70 2.83 4.57 3.53 2.82 5.04 2.36 6.77 6.27 3.86 8.76 7.52 7.81 1.31
Sensex 5.49 11.01 12.20 7.89 2.11 15.70 12.00 1.38 9.62 5.64 0.83 0.82 3.54 0.90 2.08
df 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52
Comb. {2 70.1 68.6 48.3 74.9 94.5 105 79.5 67.2 74.6 84.7 38.2 42.2 76.8 120 70.6
Prob. 0.048 0.061 0.619 0.020 <0.001 <0.001 0.008 0.077 0.022 0.003 0.923 0.834 0.014 <0.001 0.044
Developed 41.82 16.01 28.42 30.20 68.69 38.52 55.80 70.41 27.19 43.51 32.07 15.75 43.25 69.97 45.80
df 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32
Developing 33.78 52.61 19.91 44.73 25.78 66.70 35.73 10.02 47.38 41.16 17.44 26.40 33.53 50.24 24.80
df 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
Counts
p < 0.10 3 3 1 3 6 4 6 5 3 3 1 1 3 8 4
p < 0.05 0 3 1 2 2 3 3 4 3 2 0 0 2 4 2
p < 0.01 0 2 0 1 1 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0
Each cell in the main 13 indices  15 years matrix is a separate v2(4) test of the weekday effect for that index in that year. The extent to which weekday effects were present
in a particular year is gauged by combining v2 (sum of the columns). Note, 10 of the 15 years had signiﬁcant combined v2s and two further were marginally signiﬁcant.
Critical values of v2 with df = 4 are 7.78 (10% level) and 9.49 (5%). We also show combined v2s for developed (ﬁrst 8 indices) and developing economies (last 5 indices).
Signiﬁcant results (5% level) are in bold.
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Rho = 0.28 and 0.18, respectively. Therefore, the wandering
weekday is not a weekday effect in 1993 grinding towards a halt
in 2007, as in the disappearing weekday scenario painted by Ko-
hers et al. (2004). Instead, the weekday effects are as strong in
2007 as they were in 1993, albeit having different forms. The wan-
dering weekday is still wandering.
4.3.2. Conditional weekday vs. wandering weekday
In this subsection we consider whether the wandering weekday
effect can be explained by the moderating effect of market upturns
and downturns.
In comparison with Table 2, the results in Table 5 show that
Monday/weekend/weekday effects all fare much better when trea-
ted dynamically, as conditional on recent movements in the mar-
ket; and in particular, the Monday and weekend each have
nearly as many signiﬁcant effects for as many indices as does
weekday. All three versions of day seasonality are signiﬁcant when
v2s are combined over the indices. With ARMA terms included in
the model, the v2 are 462.9, 385.7, and 597.0, with df = 13, 13,
52, respectively. All p < 0.001. These results are a comprehensive
endorsement of the conditional Monday, generalized to condi-
tional weekend and conditional weekday effects, and across the
world’s major stock exchanges.
More importantly for the purposes of this article, the wandering
weekday effect is still signiﬁcant for all indices. We conclude that
the wandering weekday cannot be reduced to the conditional
weekday. In fact, judging by the relative size of the combined v2
across the indices, the conditional weekday makes little impres-
sion on the strength of the wandering weekday: v2(728) = 1840.5
for the wandering weekday when conditional effects are not ana-
lysed; and v2(728) = 1765.4 when they are. There seems little
overlap in the two effects.
The overall conclusion is that there are sources of variation in
the weekday effect that are not captured by the conditional week-day, so the latter is not a complete theory. The wandering weekday
is still unexplained.
4.4. Trading strategies
Rejecting EMH implies that it should be possible to articulate
trading strategies to beneﬁt from excess returns – the equivalent
of ‘‘buy on Monday, sell on Friday” for the traditional ﬁxed week-
end effect. It turns out that the design of our analyses is not opti-
mized for this particular purpose. Nonetheless, the attempt to do
so is worthwhile in two ways. It makes more concrete for the read-
er the transient forms of the weekday effect, and it also points up
some minimum requirements in the design of any future attempt
to capture time-varying trading rules. The wandering weekday rec-
ommends us to replace the assumption of a ﬁxed Monday effect for
all markets and for all time with information about weekday ef-
fects in a particular market, and at a particular time. As an illustra-
tion, the signiﬁcant v2 for Amex in 1997 of 16.98 (see Table 4) tests
whether the GARCH regression coefﬁcients are different from each
other. But this information alone does not tell us which should be
buying or selling days. Instead we need to consider GARCH regres-
sion coefﬁcients themselves, the usual form for which is:
Rt ¼ 0:002427þ 0:0033889DTues  0:0046587DWed
 0:0042178DThu  0:0020189DFri: ð5Þ
Tuesday through Friday have z-values, respectively, of 1.44,
1.82, 1.79, and 0.9, with 1.39 for the constant. No day has a re-
turn that is signiﬁcantly more (or less) than the base of Monday.
Eq. (5) can be re-run, or be re-arranged, to give a different day as
the base for the dummies, or with no regression constant so that
all weekdays are measured relative to zero, as follows:
Rt ¼ 0:002427DMon þ 0:0058159DTues  0:0022317DWed
 0:0017908DThu þ 0:0004081DFri: ð6Þ
Table 5
Wandering weekday in competition with conditional weekday.
No ARMA With ARMA
Cond Mon Cond w-end Cond w-day Wand w-day Cond Mon Cond w-end Cond w-day Wand w-day
v2 (df = 1) v2 (df = 1) v2 (df = 5) v2 (df = 56) v2 (df = 1) v2 (df = 1) v2 (df = 5) v2 (df = 56)
NYSE 2.80 2.12 26.99 99.22 1.63 1.39 4.40 118.66
Amex 0.01 0.06+ 16.63 98.76 0.19+ 0.45+ 26.67 103.60
Nasdaq 23.9 17.23 29.35 120.08 20.43 15.78 23.11 153.93
Nikkei 6.58 2.93 20.06 77.29 7.69 3.90 14.65 87.96
FTSE 0.29 0.13+ 15.45 80.93 0.83 0.03 8.24 96.93
DAX 16.28 13.31 21.79 88.07 6.85 5.08 13.68 113.78
CAC 1.18 0.16 19.30 88.71 1.85 0.40 8.58 103.18
Hang Seng 24.53 15.47 31.52 78.14 11.04 5.44 24.35 93.53
Shenzhen A 133.38 106.07 142.82 298.09 124.03 95.39 140.03 197.99
Shenzhen B 70.43 70.92 77.99 234.15 48.09 43.49 64.09 271.87
Shanghai A 147.09 106.83 158.51 284.16 145.25 105.35 159.13 127.05
Shanghai B 79.52 64.94 88.20 133.20 77.60 66.13 92.46 155.10
Sensex 31.94 29.03 32.44 122.69 17.39 15.86 17.58 141.85
Prob. Prob. Prob. Prob. Prob. Prob. Prob. Prob.
NYSE 0.0943 0.1454 <0.0001 0.0003 0.2017 0.2384 0.4934 <0.0001
Amex 0.9203 0.8065 0.0053 0.0004 0.6629 0.5023 <0.0001 0.0001
Nasdaq <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 0.0003 <0.0001
Nikkei 0.0103 0.0869 0.0012 0.0312 0.0056 0.0483 0.0120 0.0041
FTSE 0.5902 0.7184 0.0086 0.0163 0.3623 0.8625 0.1435 0.0006
DAX <0.0001 0.0003 0.0006 0.0040 0.0089 0.0242 0.0178 <0.0001
CAC 0.2774 0.6892 0.0017 0.0035 0.1738 0.5271 0.1270 0.0001
Hang Seng <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 0.0270 0.0009 0.0197 0.0002 0.0012
Shenzhen A <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001
Shenzhen B <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001
Shanghai A <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001
Shanghai B <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001
Sensex <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 0.0035 <0.0001
Daily returns for each market are estimated using day dummies, year dummies, year  day interaction dummies, and PW  day interaction terms, where PW is the mean
return in the previous week for that market index. The PW  day interaction terms capture the conditional effects of recent market swings on day seasonality. GARCH(1,1)
estimates the error, and models are run with and without ARMA(20,1) components. Post-estimation Wald tests are run to test:
H5: The conditional effect of market swings on the Monday effect (‘‘cond Mon” in data columns 1 and 5).
H6: The conditional effect of market swings on the weekend effect (‘‘cond w-end” in data columns 2 and 6).
H7: The conditional effect of market swings on the weekday effect (‘‘cond w-day” in data columns 3 and 7).
H8: The year  day coefﬁcients are jointly different from zero (‘‘wand w-day” in data columns 4 and 8).
H8 is the same hypothesis as in H4, but now tested in the presence of conditional day seasonal. The upper panel displays the v2s for these tests, and the lower panel their
associated probabilities (signiﬁcant ones in bold). The plus or minus sign that follows the v2(1) statistics indicates the direction of the effect, with minus indicating that
Monday returns were lower when returns in the previous week were lower, as in the conditional Monday and conditional weekday effects. Note also, v2(1) = z2, so these
columns can be turned into z-tests.
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day of approximately 13%, 34%, 11%, 9%, and 2%, respectively,
assuming 50 trading days for each weekday4. Evidently, during
1997 stocks on the Amex tended to surge ahead on Tuesdays. The
day-dummies have z-values of: 1.39, 3.67, 1.19, 1.14, and 0.29
for Monday through Friday, showing that only Tuesday’s returns
were signiﬁcantly different from zero (p < 0.001, 2-tailed). With
hindsight, a successful trading strategy for the Amex investor in
1997 would have been to sell on Tuesdays, all else being equal;
and to buy on Wednesdays or Thursdays, but with less assurance
that it is a good day to do so (indicated by their smaller z-statistics).
Stepping into the New Year of 1998, and armed with the most
up-to-date analyses (Eq. (6)), our investor might apply the same
buy-on-Tuesday strategy that would have been good for 1997.
But the fact that the weekday effect wanders implies that the
usefulness of the information in Eq. (6) will diminish as we move
further away from 1997. We get a general idea about the life-
expectancy of our estimates in a particular market by the corre-
lation between the coefﬁcients for the weekday returns for this
year and the weekday returns for next year. The median of such
correlations is just 0.175 across all years and all markets, mean-4 Let the annualized ratio of Monday gains G ¼Q50t¼1 ptpt1 (=p50/p0). Then
lnðGÞ ¼P50t¼1 lnð ptpt1Þ ¼
P50
t¼1Rt  50  0.002427 from the regression coefﬁcient for
Monday in (6). So, G  e50*0.002427  e0.12135  1.129, giving a 13% advance on
Mondays.ing that typically, only 3% of the variance in next year’s coefﬁ-
cients will be explained by this year’s. Also, only 59.3% of the cor-
relations were even positive. Therefore, estimates of daily returns
made on data from year t will be only slightly informative if used
throughout year t + 1, though presumably better at the beginning
of t + 1 than the end. This lack of carry-over is consistent with the
very few ﬁxed weekday effects we have found in earlier analyses.
There are a number of implications for the would-be investor.
First, the investor should assess whether the target market has
exploitable inefﬁciency: our results suggest that some markets of-
fer more opportunities than others. Second, because the rules
obsolesce, the investor should update his/her estimates not just
annually, as in our analyses, but as frequently as possible. Third, gi-
ven that the pattern of day seasonality changes with time in every
market, the estimating method should give greater weight to re-
cent observations in forecasting future patterns. Clearly, one direc-
tion for future research is to explore these parameters with trading
strategies as the primary focus of interest.
5. Conclusion and discussion
This article makes the case for analyzing day seasonals as time-
varying rather than as ﬁxed in time. Doing so reveals new sources
of market inefﬁciency that the standard perspective ignores. When
analyzing for ﬁxed seasonality effects among days of the week, and
combining over indices, our results show there are no Monday or
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This provides evidence for market inefﬁciency and also demon-
strates that analyzing for general weekday effects is superior to
the speciﬁc Monday or weekend effects. What the weekday effect
loses in statistical power over more precise tests, it more than
makes up for in capturing more subtle between-weekday
variability.
More importantly, we show the wandering weekday effect,
which abandons the assumption that a weekday effect is ﬁxed over
time, detects previously uncharted inefﬁciencies. Under this anal-
ysis all markets are seen to be inefﬁcient, whereas the ﬁxed week-
day identiﬁed a minority as inefﬁcient. We ﬁnd these results
robustly whether ARMA components are analyzed or not, and
whether Gaussian disturbances are assumed or not.
Generally speaking, those markets we expect to be compara-
tively more inefﬁcient are so: China and India versus the western
markets; Amex and Nasdaq versus NYSE. Analyzing the relative
efﬁciencies of markets by these and other means may be a fruitful
line of future research, particularly if these could be related to mar-
ket speciﬁc factors that might explain these inefﬁciencies.
We then establish the credibility of the conditional weekday ef-
fect as a potential challenger to the wandering weekday. We show
that the average returns of last week, whether positive versus neg-
ative, affects the form of between-weekday returns for this week.
This effect is present through all markets. If a particular year con-
sists of mostly negative return weeks, while another contains
mostly positive return weeks, this alone could drive changes to
the weekday effect. However, when pitted in direct competition,
the size of the contribution made by the wandering weekday is
barely reduced when the conditional weekday is accounted for.
The wandering weekday must be capturing sources of day seasonal
variability that cannot be explained by short-term rises of falls in
the market. Finally, decomposing the wandering weekday effect
into its constituent year-weekday effects, we show that size of
the weekday effect across the markets in our sample, has not de-
creased over the years (towards an efﬁcient market). It is as strong
now as it was 15 years ago.
Yet these ﬁndings contradict the conclusions drawn by Kohers
et al. (2004, p. 170): ‘‘With improvements in market efﬁciency over
time, the day-of-the-week effect may have disappeared in more re-
cent years.” This contradiction is particularly surprising because
the years they analyse (1990–2002) and several of the markets
(USA, Japan, UK, France, Germany, Hong Kong) overlap our own
sample. Although Kohers et al.’s sample only included developed
economies, the contradiction cannot be attributed to the develop-
ing economies in our sample. We found the same lack of trend to-
wards efﬁciency when both developed and developing economies
were examined as separate subsets.
Two more plausible reasons for the discrepancy are ﬁrst, that
we take the entire sample of indices as our ultimate unit of analy-
sis, and combine small weekday effects from each index into an-
nual tests of market efﬁciency. On the other hand, Kohers et al.
take the individual index as their unit of analysis, and do not assess
whether the separate small signals from multiple markets add up
to a more comprehensive, and therefore sensitive view of market
inefﬁciency.
Second, from analyzing the ﬁxed weekday effect over a 15 year
period, our results suggest that its long-termmemory may be poor.
But analyzing in time-slices of one year (either as year  day inter-
actions, or as single year weekday effects to be later aggregated)
ensures that its memory is checked frequently enough, and over
short enough durations, to detect that it must remember. By con-
trast, Kohers et al. reported 6- and 11-year time-slices. What seems
to be important in analyzing modern data is to cast a net with a
sufﬁciently ﬁne mesh.To conclude, this article reports a wandering weekday effect for
the major stock market indices. Our results show that the weekday
effect wanders in a way that must lie between a random walk and
a ﬁxed (weekday) effect. This ﬁnding provides new evidence
against the EMH. However, given that we have no universal princi-
ple to show us how it wanders (and there may be none), it is difﬁ-
cult to extract excess returns from it. In this way markets, though
still demonstrably inefﬁcient, may yet ‘‘satisﬁce” by being efﬁcient
enough to discourage the search for anomalous returns.Acknowledgements
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